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Institutionalization as Discrimination: How 
Medicaid Waivers, the ADA, and § 1983 Fail* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In February 1999, I became employed with Cottonwood, Inc., a 
service provider for adults with developmental disabilities.  I worked 
with women who lived together in a group home.  I was responsible for 
assisting these women in living their lives as they saw fit.  As my job 
title changed over the years, my responsibility remained primarily the 
same: helping someone with a developmental disability live the way they 
wanted.  In addition to a greater understanding of this role, I also became 
aware of the structure in which this role exists.  Many of the people I 
worked with were eligible for Medicaid services, and received these 
services through one of Kansass home and community-based waiver 
programs. 
Eventually, I left Cottonwood to work at Kansas Advocacy and 
Protective Services, Inc. (now the Disability Rights Center of Kansas).  
There, I discovered that an extensive waiting list for home and 
community-based services inhibits access to these services.  I also 
discovered that there were a variety of waiver programs, and some 
difficulty in not only qualifying for the programs, but in getting off the 
waiting lists and actually receiving the program services.   
Consider the following scenario: Jane Smith has a disability which 
qualifies her for institutional care, such as placement in a nursing home 
or state hospital.  After spending time in this institution, a medical 
professional determines that with enough staff supportattendants to 
assist with daily living needsJane could be in a community setting like 
a group home or even her own apartment.  Jane has a right to services in 
the most integrated setting.  Janes family helps her locate an appropriate 
place nearby which can accommodate Jane.  Unfortunately, there is not 
an open space on the Medicaid waiver program to fund Janes placement.  
Jane cannot work because her disability is severe, and there is no other 
way to raise the funds necessary to support her in a community setting.  
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a community-living situation?  This Comment will revisit Janes 
dilemma throughout its analysis. 
Under the New Freedom Initiative,1 the federal government is 
pouring money into state Medicaid programs to facilitate the movement 
of Americans with disabilities from institutions into community settings.2  
Steps must be taken to ensure those individuals rights throughout the 
process.  The current § 1983 Medicaid jurisprudence offers insight into 
the present civil rights dilemma arising from these questions: How can 
individuals enforce their Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) right to 
services in the most integrated setting while receiving Medicaid-provided 
health care without imposing undue financial hardship on individual 
states?  Will Medicaid waiver programs and the courts erode protections 
given to people with disabilities by the ADA?  How do the ADA and § 
1983 Medicaid litigation work incongruously in ultimate service 
provision? 
While the circuits continue to decide and argue over which 
provisions of Medicaid confer rights to individuals, states continue to 
change their Medicaid plans implementing the federal statute.  Most 
states use § 1396n(c) waivers to provide home and community-based 
services.  A growing number of states are also implementing 
demonstration projects using § 1315 waivers.  The waiver programs and 
demonstration projects allow states greater flexibility in reaching the 
goals of Medicaid.  However, this flexibility also changes a number of 
requirementsincluding eligibility requirementsfor Medicaid 
recipients.  In some cases, this might mean an increased recipient pool.  
In other cases, this might mean a limited service in a single portion of the 
state.  Regardless of the actual impact of the program or demonstration 
project, there are additional legal impacts for Medicaid recipients. 
This Comment argues that as states seek cost-effective ways to 
implement Medicaid provisions and provide services, states also 
endanger the fragile legal right individuals have to a private cause of 
action under § 1983 to enforce their access to prompt health care services 
                                                     
 * Julia Gilmore Gaughan.  J.D. candidate 2008, University of Kansas School of Law; B.A. 
2001, University of Kansas.  I would like to thank Professors Elizabeth Weeks and Stephen 
McAllister for their review and assistance with this Comment.  I would also like to thank my 
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 1. Exec. Order No. 13,217, 66 Fed. Reg. 33,155 (June 18, 2001), available at http://www. 
whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010619.html. 
 2. Ron Knox, U.S. to Move Elderly, Disabled from Institutions, LAWRENCE JOURNAL-WORLD 
(Kan.), Oct. 9, 2006, at B1; Medical News Today, States Get Federal Grants to Help People With 
Disabilities Live in the Community, USA, Sept. 16, 2006, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/ 
articles/52045.php (last visited Dec. 20, 2007). 
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under Medicaid.  This erosion of rights combines with the decision in 
Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring3 in a surprising way, creating less 
protection for people with disabilities from ADA-prohibited 
discrimination.  While states must be permitted flexibility to meet the 
growing needs and costs of Medicaid, additional steps must be taken to 
ensure both the entitlement nature of Medicaid for Americans with 
disabilities and the right to receive services of public accommodation in 
the most integrated setting under the ADA. 
Part II of this Comment outlines the Medicaid program generally and 
the waiver programs in detail.  Then, relevant portions of the ADA are 
discussed, followed by an extensive look at Olmstead, a landmark 
disability rights decision.  Part II culminates with a review of the 
subsequent decisions upholding Olmstead, and a discussion of the 
interplay between these decisions and access to community-based 
Medicaid services. 
In Part III, this Comment outlines § 1983 jurisprudence as it relates 
to the enforcement of Medicaid provisions.  After briefly discussing the 
test set forth in Blessing v. Freestone and the initial Wilder v. Virginia 
Hospital Association decision finding Medicaid enforceable with § 1983, 
Part III ends in an examination of circuit court decisions covering 
Medicaid both outside and within a waiver program context.  In Part IV, 
this Comment analyzes the Olmstead and § 1983 Medicaid issues 
together in light of new attempts to move individuals out of institutions.  
Both Supremacy Clause litigation and policy initiatives will be reviewed 
in their capacity to protect the civil rights of people with disabilities in 
the face of further Medicaid devolution. 
II. HEALTH CARE IN THE MOST INTEGRATED SETTING FOR AMERICANS 
WITH DISABILITIES 
Since its enactment, Medicaid has been amended and developed 
extensively to meet a variety of needs and assuage political desires and 
fears.4  Medicaids statutory structure has remained relatively 
unchanged,5 but interpretation of Medicaids structure has grown 
                                                     
 3. 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
 4. See generally KAISER COMMN ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, MEDICAID: A 
TIMELINE OF KEY DEVELOPMENTS, http://www.kff.org/Medicaid/Medicaid_timeline.cfm (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2007). 
 5. Sara Rosenbaum, Medicaid at Forty: Revisiting Structure and Meaning in a Post-Deficit 
Reduction Act Era, 9 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POLY 5, 11 (2006). 
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increasingly narrow.6  Although the ADA was enacted twenty-five years 
after Medicaid, the ADAs requirements uniquely interact with 
Medicaidsomething the courts have been loathe to address. 
A. An Overview of Medicaid and Medicaid Waiver Programs 
Medicaid is a program administered by the states and funded jointly 
by the states and the federal government.7  Over fifty-five million people 
are enrolled in Medicaid; approximately fourteen percent of these 
enrollees have disabilities.8  While Congress created Medicaid at the 
same time it created Medicare, the nature of the entitlement to 
Medicaid is less clear than the entitlement to Medicare.9  Total Medicaid 
expenditures will exceed $300 billion in 2006.10  Over one-third of 
these Medicaid dollars are spent on long-term care services: services for 
both elderly and non-elderly persons in institutional settings and in home 
and community-based setting[s].11  Looking at both general state plan 
requirements and the waiver programs states use to provide long-term 
care provides background for the present legal conundrum. 
1. State Plan Requirements 
In order for states to receive federal Medicaid dollars, each state 
must submit a state plan for medical assistance which meets numerous 
requirements.12  States have been permitted a great deal of discretion as 
to the populations that they cover and enjoy a great deal of latitude as 
to which benefits they cover with their individual programs.13  The most 
applicable of these state plan requirements to this Comment are found in  
 
                                                     
 6. See id. at 24 ([T]he right to seek individual redress for violation of statutory obligations is 
increasingly confined to selected program elements.). 
 7. KAISER COMMN ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, LOW MEDICAID SPENDING GROWTH 
AMID REBOUNDING STATE REVENUES: RESULTS FROM A 50-STATE MEDICAID BUDGET SURVEY 
STATE FISCAL YEARS 2006 AND 2007 13 (2006), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/ 
7569.pdf [hereinafter 2006 KFF Medicaid State Survey]. 
 8. Id. at 11. 
 9. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC 
HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 3034 (2003) (discussing the 
entitlement language of Medicare versus the absence of entitlement language in the Medicaid 
statute). 
 10. 2006 KFF Medicaid State Survey, supra note 7, at 13. 
 11. Id. at 11. 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (2000). 
 13. JOST, supra note 9, at 163. 
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§§ 1396a(a)(1), 1396a(a)(8), 1396a(a)(10)(B), 1396a(a)(17), and 
1396a(a)(30). 
Section 1396a(a)(1), the Statewideness Provision,14 requires the state 
plan to be effective throughout the state.15  Section 1396a(a)(8), the 
Reasonable Promptness Provision,16 requires that eligibility 
determinations and medical assistance be provided with reasonable 
promptness.17  Section 1396a(a)(10)(B), the Quality of Care Provision,18 
requires that medical assistance provided under the state plan shall not 
be less in amount, duration, or scope than the medical assistance made 
available to any other such individual.19  Section 1396a(a)(17), the 
Reasonable Standards Provision, requires states to provide reasonable 
standards for use in determining individual Medicaid eligibility and the 
extent that individuals can receive medical assistance under the 
program.20  Section 1396a(a)(30)(A), the Equal Access Provision,21 
requires that the payment for medical assistance be enough to guarantee 
provider availability to Medicaid recipients equal to that available to the 
general population.22 
Medical assistance is discussed throughout each of these 
provisions and has a particularly important meaning in Medicaid 
litigation.  The Act defines medical assistance to mean payment of part 
or all of the cost of the following care and services for eligible 
individuals.23  The majority of courts specifically hold that this definition 
of medical assistance includes only the payment, not the provision of 
medical services.24 
                                                     
 14. See Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins, 428 F. Supp. 2d 585, 619 (W.D. Tex. 2006) 
(terming § 1396a(a)(1) the Statewideness Provision in order to clarify discussion of that specific 
subsection), revd and remanded, No. 06-50599, 2007 WL 4295380 (5th Cir. Dec. 10, 2007). 
 15. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(1). 
 16. See Equal Access, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 620 (terming § 1396a(a)(8) the Reasonable 
Promptness Provision). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8). 
 18. See Equal Access, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 614 (terming § 1396a(a)(10)(B) the Quality of Care 
Provision). 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B). 
 20. Id. § 1396a(a)(17). 
 21. See Equal Access, 428 F. Supp. 2d at 611 (terming § 1396a(a)(30)(A) the Equal Access 
Provision). 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A). 
 23. Id. § 1396d(a). 
 24. Mandy R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 2006); Westside Mothers v. 
Olszewski, 454 F.3d 532, 540 (6th Cir. 2006).  One commentator has proposed promulgation of a 
new medical assistance definition focusing on provision as opposed to payment of services for the 
fee-for-service Medicaid recipients.  Kenneth R. Wiggins, Note, Medicaid and the Enforceable 
Right to Receive Medical Assistance: The Need for a Definition of Medical Assistance, 47 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1487, 150810 (2006). 
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2. The Waiver Programs 
Generally, Medicaid operates like a typical health insurance 
programonce services have been provided, the provider is reimbursed 
under a fee schedule (fee-for-service).  However, for beneficiaries with 
complex medical needs, this structure can be cumbersome and cost-
prohibitive.  Congress first established the waiver programs with the 
enactment of § 1396n(c) in 1981.25  While only six states operated 
waiver programs during the first year,26 the availability of home and 
community-based services represented a move from institutional care 
toward the independent living model of care for people with 
disabilities.27  The primary types of waiver authority discussed here 
(HCBS and Demonstration Project waivers) are granted within the 
discretion of the Secretary of Health and Human Services.28  Both of 
these waiver programs require budget neutrality: that is, the federal cost 
of Medicaid for a particular state under a waiver program cannot exceed 
the cost of Medicaid without the waiver program in that state.29  To 
achieve this, states apply for waiver programs to cover a certain number 
of individuals and fill these slots as space (and funding) becomes 
available.  Until space is available, eligible individuals remain on waiting 
lists. 
a. HCBS Waivers 
Home and community-based services waivers (HCBS waivers), 
found in § 1396n(c), allow for the provision of medical assistance to 
                                                     
 25. Andrew I. Batavia, A Right to Personal Assistance Services: Most Integrated Setting 
Appropriate Requirements and the Independent Living Model of Long-Term Care, 27 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 17, 24 (2001). 
 26. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LONG-TERM CARE: FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF GROWING 
MEDICAID HOME AND COMMUNITY-BASED WAIVERS SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED 11 (2003), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03576.pdf [hereinafter 2003 GAO HCBS Oversight 
Report]. 
 27. Batavia, supra note 25, at 24.  This move was particularly important considering the 
struggle the disability rights movement had faced with getting the regulatory framework of § 504 of 
the 1973 Rehabilitation Act signed into effect.  See JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH 
DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 6470 (1993) (describing the San 
Francisco protests organized by disability rights activists, which ultimately led to the signing of the 
Rehabilitation Acts regulatory framework four years after its passage). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) and § 1315. 
 29. ROBIN RUDOWITZ & ANDY SCHNEIDER, KAISER COMMN ON MEDICAID AND THE 
UNINSURED, THE NUTS AND BOLTS OF MAKING MEDICAID POLICY CHANGES: AN OVERVIEW AND A 
LOOK AT THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT 10 (2006), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/ 
7550.pdf. 
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individuals, who would otherwise be institutionalized, in the privacy of 
their own home or some other community environment.30  They are 
designed to allow states to experiment with methods of care, or to 
provide care on a targeted basis, without adhering to the strict mandates 
of the Medicaid system.31  HCBS waivers specifically allow states to 
waive the Statewideness and the Quality of Care Provisions.32  
Furthermore, these waivers allow states to overlook certain income and 
resource rules33 and allow states to limit the recipients of services under 
the waiver program.34  In ten years, HCBS waivers grew from 5 percent 
of all Medicaid long-term care spending in fiscal year 1991 to 19 percent 
in fiscal year 2001.35  Now, over 250 HCBS waiver programs exist.36  
These waivers often represent less expensive and more comprehensive 
alternatives to institutional care.37  Often, the type of care an individual 
requires does not need to be provided by a licensed health care 
professional, but alternatively can be provided by someone the individual 
chooses and trains to care for his or her unique needs. 
b. Demonstration Project Waivers 
Another type of waiver is the Demonstration Project waiver found in 
§ 1315.38  Unlike the limited waived provisions of HCBS waivers, § 
1315 allows the Secretary of Health and Human Services to approve 
projects that do not comply with any of the provisions of the State Plan 
requirements located in § 1396a to the extent and for the period he finds 
necessary to enable such State or States to carry out such project.39  In 
2001, the Bush administration began emphasizing Demonstration Project 
waivers through the Health Insurance Flexibility and Accountability 
                                                     
 30. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(1).  These waivers are sometimes referred to as 1915(c) waivers, but 
will be referred to generally as HCBS waivers in this Comment. 
 31. Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 82 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(3). 
 33. Id.  
 34. Id. § 1396n(c)(4)(A). 
 35. 2003 GAO HCBS Oversight Report, supra note 26, at 3. 
 36. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE AND MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAID WAIVERS AND DEMONSTRATIONS 
LIST, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidStWaivProgDemoPGI/MWDL/list.asp (last visited Dec. 20, 
2007) [hereinafter CMS Waiver Program List] (containing a complete list of current Medicaid 
waiver and demonstration projects). 
 37. Jane Perkins & Randolph T. Boyle, Addressing Long Waits for Home and Community-
Based Care Through Medicaid and the ADA, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 117, 140 (2001). 
 38. These waivers are sometimes referred to as 1115 waivers but will be referred to as 
Demonstration Project waivers in this Comment. 
 39. 42 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(1). 
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Initiative (HIFA).40  There are currently over 130 Demonstration Project 
waivers in use.41  While previous reports indicated an increasing interest 
by the states to use these waivers, newer reports show slowed growth in 
this area due to the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005.42  The Deficit 
Reduction Act (DRA) allows for a number of changes in state plans 
which previously required waivers but now only require an amendment 
to the state plan.43 
c. Other Waiver Programs 
The DRA implemented two additional waiver programs: Health 
Opportunity Accounts and Money Follows the Person.44  The impact of 
the DRA generally, and Money Follows the Person in particular, will be 
discussed more thoroughly in Part IV.AB.  However, it is important to 
note that both of the DRA waivers differ from the HCBS and 
Demonstration Project waivers in that they do not require budget 
neutrality while offering the same freedom from regulation as 
Demonstration Project waivers.45 
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act and Olmstead 
Even as Congress recognized that cost-saving in the administration 
of Medicaid accompanied greater individual rights, more work was 
needed to secure the civil rights of individuals with disabilities. 
                                                     
 40. JOST, supra note 9, at 171. 
 41. See CMS Waiver Program List, supra note 36 (select show only items containing the 
following word and enter 1115 for a complete list of current Medicaid waiver and demonstration 
projects).  For a general critique of Demonstration Project waivers, see Jonathan R. Bolton, Note, 
The Case of the Disappearing Statute: A Legal and Policy Critique of the Use of Section 1115 
Waivers to Restructure the Medicaid Program, 37 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 91 (2003). 
 42. Pub. L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat. 4 (2006). 
 43. 2006 KFF Medicaid State Survey, supra note 7, at 4748.  The impacts of the DRA on 
access to alternatives to institutional care will be discussed more thoroughly in Part IV.B. 
 44. RUDOWITZ & SCHNEIDER, supra note 29, at 13.  In addition to the HCBS and 
Demonstration Project waivers and the DRA waiver programs, waivers exist under § 1396n(b).  This 
class of waivers can be used to promote cost-effectiveness and efficiency and allows states to waive 
a variety of provisions of the State Plan requirements.  However, these waivers are fairly similar to 
HCBS waivers and, more importantly, have not been analyzed under § 1983 or in comparison with 
the ADA.  Thus a review of these waivers would not be useful in evaluating the waiver programs 
impact on individual rights. 
 45. RUDOWITZ & SCHNEIDER, supra note 29, at 13. 
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1. The Americans with Disabilities Act 
The Americans with Disabilities Act46 prohibits discrimination 
against people with disabilities in a number of ways.  Of importance here 
is the prohibition of discrimination by public entities: Subject to the 
provisions of this subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability 
shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or 
be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public 
entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.47  The 
enacting regulations further clarify that public entities must administer 
services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting 
appropriate to the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.48  
When states administer their Medicaid programs, according to the ADA, 
the states have an obligation not to discriminate against qualified 
individuals with disabilities. 
The Act defines a qualified individual with a disability as: an 
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable 
modifications to rules, policies, or practices . . . meets the essential 
eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in 
programs or activities provided by a public entity.49  Disability means 
a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of 
the major life activities of such individual.50  Thus, Medicaid should 
serve its eligible participants whose impairment substantially limits one 
or more . . . major life activities in the most integrated setting 
appropriate. 
With the ADA, Congress recognized that people with disabilities had 
been historically isolated and segregated, and such forms of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a 
serious and pervasive social problem.51  This language lays the 
foundation to view the most integrated setting requirement as a way to 
move past a specific form of discrimination faced by people with 
disabilities. 
                                                     
 46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12300 (2000). 
 47. Id. § 12132.  Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act also prohibits discrimination against 
people with disabilities by any group receiving federal funding.  29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).  While 
additional time could be spent on this topic, the § 504 analysis would be similar to the ADA analysis 
in its present application and will not be discussed in this Comment. 
 48. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2006).  Section 35.130(f) has met with the criticism that it is 
unconstitutional or invalid. 
 49. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). 
 50. Id. § 12102(2)(A). 
 51. Id. § 12101(a)(2). 
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The ADA was passed in 1990an earthshaking event for disabled 
people.52  The prohibitions against discrimination, as described above, 
were in response to the continuous exclusion of people with disabilities 
from everyday activities like using public buildings, dining out, going to 
the movies, and even working.53  Disability rights activists had shown 
their outrage about years of unnecessary institutionalization,54 and 
celebrated when the Court announced its decision in Olmstead. 
2. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring 
Two women diagnosed with mental retardation and mental illness 
had voluntarily admitted themselves into a Georgia hospital for 
treatment.55  One woman remained there three years after stabilizing.56  
The other woman remained there two years after stabilizing.57  The first 
woman filed suit two years into her stay invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 
the ADA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1213134; the second woman intervened with 
identical claims.58  In response to the original complaint, Georgia raised a 
cost-based defense, arguing that it was already using all available funds 
to provide services to other persons with disabilities, and that requiring 
immediate transfers [to less restrictive environments] in cases of this 
order would fundamentally alter the States activity.59  Ultimately, 
these women began receiving community-based treatment, but their case 
still received review by the Supreme Court.60 
The Supreme Court concluded, solely on ADA grounds, that the 
institutionalization these women faced was prohibited discrimination: 
Specifically, we confront the question whether the proscription of 
discrimination may require placement of persons with mental disabilities 
in community settings rather than in institutions.  The answer, we hold, is 
a qualified yes.61  The Court qualified its decision by stating that 
placement in a community setting should be made if it can be 
reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources available to 
                                                     
 52. SHAPIRO, supra note 27, at 140. 
 53. Id. at 10506. 
 54. See id. at 13940, 15865 (discussing stories of institutionalization and the rise of 
institutionalization). 
 55. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 593 (1999). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 59394. 
 59. Id. at 594. 
 60. Id. at 594 n.6. 
 61. Id. at 587. 
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the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities.62  The Court 
stated that the States responsibility . . . is not boundless.63  A 
community placement is preferred to institutional care, but states might 
not be required to provide community placement for everyone who seeks 
it.  The Court opined, in dicta: 
If, for example, the State were to demonstrate that it had a 
comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing qualified persons 
with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a waiting list that 
moved at a reasonable pace not controlled by the States endeavors to 
keep its institutions fully populated, the reasonable-modifications 
standard would be met.64 
This comprehensive, effectively working plan has since been 
referred to as an Olmstead plan.65  Although Georgias Medicaid waiver 
program was not at issue, this language has been used by other courts in 
determining whether states are discriminating against individuals with 
disabilities who continue to reside in institutions despite the existence of 
waiver programs designed to increase community placement. 
If community-based services are cost-effective66 and institutional 
care is discriminatory,67 why is there still a fightevidenced by yet 
another initiative to end unnecessary institutionalization68to keep 
people with disabilities from moving out of restrictive environments?  
While Olmstead represents a victory for people with disabilities,69 it has 
not worked with Medicaid as advocates hoped.70  Perhaps states are still 
concerned that the savings they currently enjoy from these [home-
based] programs would evaporate if such help is made widely available, 
and that people with disabilities will come out of the woodwork.71  
                                                     
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 603. 
 64. Id. at 60506. 
 65. E.g., Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1064 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 66. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing waiver program cost-effectiveness). 
 67. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing Supreme Courts finding that institutionalization is 
prohibited discrimination under the ADA). 
 68. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 69. The Olmstead decision was viewed as encouraging community-based placement, when 
appropriate, over institutionalization.  Perkins & Boyle, supra note 37, at 141. 
 70. See id. at 14243 ([W]hile states may be able to cite budgetary constraints to limit their 
accommodations to achieve integration under the ADA, budgetary constraints alone should not 
excuse a state from complying with the Medicaid Act.).  See also Sara Rosenbaum et al., Olmstead 
v. L.C.: Implications for Medicaid and Other Publicly Funded Health Services, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 
93, 93 (2002) (But Olmsteads true importance from a health policy perspective lies in its long-term 
potential to secure realignment of public spending on health services for persons with disabilities.). 
 71. SHAPIRO, supra note 27, at 25253 (please note this book was authored pre-Olmstead).  See 
 
08 - GAUGHAN FINAL.DOC 2/13/2008  2:47:18 PM 
416 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56 
Additionally, some states cite a persistent lack of infrastructure in place 
to provide in-home care.72  Shortly after Olmstead was decided, a 
number of suits were brought seeking guidance on waiver program 
requirements.73  Despite initial efforts,74 the Circuit Courts of Appeals 
have provided little encouragement in using the ADA to effect de-
institutionalization. 
3. A Collective Right to Freedom from Institutionalization 
The Olmstead Court encouraged states to have a comprehensive, 
effectively working plan for placing qualified persons with mental 
disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a waiting list that moved at a 
reasonable pace.75  At the time Olmstead was decided, states, 
encouraged by the federal government,76 were showing increased interest 
in HCBS waivers.77  Waiver programs appeared to be the way to provide 
the integration mandated by the ADA.  Recall, though, that waiver 
programs work because of their ability to operate outside the strict 
mandates of Medicaid.78  Arc of Washington State, Inc. v. Braddock79 
illustrates this tension between waiver programs, Medicaid requirements, 
and the Olmstead decision. 
In Arc of Washington State, the Arc, a disability-rights group, filed 
suit against the State of Washington for violations of the ADA, claiming 
that Washingtons HCBS program [was] too small to accommodate the 
states population of eligible participants.80  The Arc demanded that  
 
                                                                                                                       
also Perkins & Boyle, supra note 37, at 119 (discussing that the states shift to funding services in 
home and community settings has been delicate because of concerns that people who are being 
cared for in institutions or by family members will come out of the woodwork and place heavy 
demands on limited Medicaid budgets). 
 72. Knox, supra note 2. 
 73. See Perkins & Boyle, supra note 37, at 12730 (discussing cases arising after Olmstead 
involving Medicaid waiver program requirements). 
 74. See id. (discussing federal district court outcomes in suits seeking enforcement of freedom 
of choice and reasonable promptness provisions of Medicaid for beneficiaries seeking services 
through HCBS waivers). 
 75. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 60506 (1999). 
 76. See id. at 601 (Indeed, the United States points out that the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) has a policy of encouraging States to take advantage of the waiver program, 
and often approves more waiver slots than a State ultimately uses.). 
 77. 2003 GAO HCBS Oversight Report, supra note 26, at 11 (By 1992, 48 states operated a 
total of 155 HCBS waivers.  As of June 2002, 49 states and the District of Columbia operated a total 
of 263 HCBS waivers . . . .). 
 78. Bryson v. Shumway, 308 F.3d 79, 82 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 79. 427 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 80. Id. at 619. 
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Washington request federal authorization for an increase in the size of 
its HCBS waiver program.81 
The Ninth Circuit harkened back to the Olmstead escape clause: 
[t]he States responsibility, once it provides community-based 
treatment to qualified persons with disabilities is not boundless.82  The 
Ninth Circuit reasoned that satisfying the Arcs demands depended on 
whether changing the size of the HCBS waiver program was a 
reasonable modification (which is required [by the ADA]) or a 
fundamental alteration (which is not [required by the ADA]).83  
Because the court found Washington to have a comprehensive, 
effectively working plan and its commitment to deinstitutionalization 
[was] . . . genuine, comprehensive and reasonable, the court held that 
requiring an increase in waiver slots would constitute[] a fundamental 
alteration, and is not required by the ADA.84  Simply put, the court 
would not require an increase in the waiver programs size because the 
state had established a working Olmstead plan. 
Arc of Washington State, though not frequently cited, represented an 
affirmation of the Ninth Circuits decision in Sanchez ex rel. Hoebel v. 
Johnson,85 and its reasoning was used in Bryson v. Stephen86 to prevent 
another requested expansion of a waiver program to qualified individuals 
with disabilities seeking community-based services.87 
While the institutionalization of people with disabilities is a 
recognized form of discrimination, one person does not have the same 
individual protection against institutionalization as they would have 
against other forms of discrimination, such as employment or housing 
discrimination.  Theoretically, the ADA could be used to enforce access 
to home and community-based services.  But in practice it is systemic 
                                                     
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. (citing Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 603). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 62122 (internal citations omitted).  Also important to this decision were the 
following factors: 
Washingtons HCBS program (1) is sizeable, with a cap that has increased substantially 
over the past two decades; (2) is full; (3) is available to all Medicaid-eligible disabled 
persons as slots become available, based only on their mental-health needs and position 
on the waiting list; (4) has already significantly reduced the size of the states 
institutionalized population; and (5) has experienced budget growth in time with, or 
exceeding, other state agencies. 
Id. 
 85. 416 F.3d 1051, 106768 (9th Cir. 2005).  This case will be discussed in further detail in 
Part III.B.2, as it relates to § 1983 Medicaid jurisprudence. 
 86. No. 99-CV-558-SM, 2006 WL 2805238, at *36 (D.N.H. Sept. 29, 2006). 
 87. Id. at *5. 
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accessnot individual accesswhich is protected.  Consider Janes 
dilemma: what can Jane do to move out of the institution and into a 
community setting within the ADA-waiver program framework?  So 
long as the state Jane lives in has an acceptable Olmstead plan, Jane only 
has a right to have her name placed on a waiting list and wait until a slot 
on a waiver program becomes available.  What would happen if someone 
were told that he or she had to wait on a list until a slot became available 
for her to vote?  To go to elementary school?  To use the bus?  The 
hurdles imposed by the Olmstead-waiver combination are too high for 
most individuals.  However, other legal frameworks exist through which 
people with disabilities have sought enforcement of their civil rights. 
III. AN OVERVIEW OF § 1983 AND § 1983 ACTIONS BROUGHT TO 
ENFORCE MEDICAID PROVISIONS 
Section 1983 imposes liability on individuals acting under the color 
of law for depriving others of rights protected by the U.S. Constitution 
and federal law.88  To determine whether a federal law contains a federal 
right, the Supreme Court set forth a test in Blessing v. Freestone89 which 
has since been clarified by Gonzaga University v. Doe.90 
A. The Blessing Test 
In order to successfully enforce a federal right using § 1983, the 
plaintiff must demonstrate the following elements.  Congress must have 
intended the statutory provision conferring the right to benefit the 
plaintiff.91  The statutory right cannot be so vague and amorphous that 
its enforcement would strain judicial competence.92  Finally, the statute 
must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States.93 
The Supreme Court used Gonzaga to clarify the first prong of this 
test by requiring that nothing less than an unambiguously conferred 
right supports a cause of action brought under § 1983.94  Once the 
Blessing test is satisfied, there is a presumption that [the federal statute] 
                                                     
 88. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). 
 89. 520 U.S. 329 (1997). 
 90. See 536 U.S. 273, 28283 (2002) (outlining the Blessing test and clarifying the first prong). 
 91. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283. 
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is subject to private enforcement under section 1983.95  This 
presumption can be rebutted if Congress expressly or impliedly 
foreclosed enforcement under section 1983; an implied foreclosure 
occurs if Congress created a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is 
incompatible with individual enforcement.96  The ADA, unlike 
Medicaid, is an example of a statute with its own comprehensive 
enforcement scheme.97 
B. Applications to Medicaid Provisions 
Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association98 first recognized a Medicaid 
provision as enforceable by § 1983.99  Although the provision discussed 
in Wilder is no longer part of Medicaid, Wilder was used in deciding 
both Blessing and Gonzaga, and still presents pertinent reasoning in § 
1983 Medicaid litigation.  Specifically, the Supreme Court held in Wilder 
that the particular provision impose[d] a binding obligation on States 
participating in the Medicaid program to adopt reasonable and adequate 
rates and that this obligation is enforceable under § 1983 by health care 
providers.100  The Court looked to the mandatory rather than precatory 
terms of the statute.101  The Court also found that [t]he Medicaid Act 
contains no . . . provision for private judicial or administrative 
enforcement.102 
Although the Supreme Court has examined § 1983 since Wilder, it 
has not examined litigation using § 1983 to enforce other Medicaid 
provisions or the impact the waiver programs might have on whether § 
1983 may still be used to enforce Medicaid provisions.  The Circuit 
Courts of Appeals have addressed multiple § 1983 actions seeking 
enforcement of various Medicaid provisions, and at times, in light of 
waiver programs.  Comparing the enforceable provisions with those 
                                                     
 95. Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1158 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 96. Id. at 115859 (citing Blessing). 
 97. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2000) (containing the enforcement provisions for violations of the 
public entity prohibition against discrimination). 
 98. 496 U.S. 498 (1990), superseded by statute, Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 
105-33, 111 Stat. 251, as recognized in Roob v. Fisher, 856 N.E.2d 723 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
 99. Id. at 50102.  Although Wilder has been superseded by statute, similar analysis was used 
in Blessing and Gonzaga.  See Frederick H. Cohen, An Unfulfilled Promise of the Medicaid Act: 
Enforcing Medicaid Recipients Right to Health Care, 17 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 375, 391 (2005) 
(The Supreme Court expressly upheld the enforceability of rights under the Medicaid Act through 
[s]ection 1983 in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association.). 
 100. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 512. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 521. 
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waived in order to enact the HCBS and Demonstration Project waivers 
shows the extent of waiver impact on individual rights. 
1. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Chiles to Sabree v. Richman: Section 1983 
Applied Outside of the Waiver Program Context 
As required by Gonzaga, courtsdetermining whether a statute 
grants an unambiguously conferred right that § 1983 may be 
appropriately used to enforcemust look carefully at the actual language 
of the statute.103  The following cases involve analysis of the Reasonable 
Promptness,104 Quality of Care,105 and Equal Access106 provisions of 
Medicaid state plan requirements.  Because these cases do not involve 
waiver programs, each of these provisions must be satisfied by a states 
Medicaid plan in order for the state to continue to receive Medicaid 
funding.107  The question is whether an individual can enforce these 
requirements through § 1983. 
In 1998before Gonzagathe Eleventh Circuit decided Doe ex rel. 
Doe v. Chiles,108 a case involving people with developmental disabilities 
seeking enforcement of the Reasonable Promptness Provision under § 
1983 to access services in intermediate care facilities.109  The Reasonable 
Promptness Provision states that a state Medicaid plan must provide that 
all individuals wishing to make application for medical assistance under 
the plan shall have the opportunity to do so, and that such assistance shall 
be furnished with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.110  
After application of the Blessing test, the court held that the Reasonable 
Promptness Provision constituted a federal right . . . and that this right is 
enforceable under section 1983.111  The statutory language of the 
Reasonable Promptness Provision is undoubtedly cast in mandatory 
rather than precatory terms, as evidenced by the use of shall and 
must.112  Although the court found the Reasonable Promptness 
Provision to be enforceable with § 1983 under the Blessing test, the  
 
                                                     
 103. See supra Part III.A. 
 104. See supra notes 1617 and accompanying text. 
 105. See supra notes 1819 and accompanying text. 
 106. See supra notes 2122 and accompanying text. 
 107. See supra Part II.A.2 (explaining the mechanics of Medicaid waiver programs). 
 108. 136 F.3d 709 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 109. Id. at 711. 
 110. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (2000). 
 111. Doe, 136 F.3d at 719. 
 112. Id. at 718. 
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Eleventh Circuit has not revisited the issue since, and in light of, 
Gonzaga. 
To further place this decision in its historical context, Doe was 
decided before Olmstead,113 but Olmstead also originated in the Eleventh 
Circuit.114  Furthermore, although the ADA had been enacted for two 
years at the time the suit was filed, no discrimination claims were 
brought under the ADA.115  No Medicaid waiver was at issue, either. 
In 2003, the Seventh Circuit decided Bruggeman ex rel. Bruggemen 
v. Blagojevich, a case involving both Medicaid and ADA violations.116  
Unfortunately, Bruggeman is not particularly helpful.  The decision lacks 
§ 1983 and implied-right analysis, and remands the ADA claim for 
determination as to whether Illinois had an Olmstead-type plan.117  The 
case is more helpful for developing the definition of medical assistance 
as financial assistance rather than . . . actual medical services.118 
In 2004, the Third Circuit decided Sabree ex rel. Sabree v. 
Richman,119 a § 1983 claim from Plaintiffs with mental retardation in 
need of medical services from an intermediate care facility for persons 
with mental retardation.120  The Plaintiffs were Medicaid-qualified but 
had not yet received Medicaid assistance from Pennsylvania.121  The 
court determined that both the Reasonable Promptness and the Quality of 
Care Provisions of Medicaid were enforceable under § 1983 using 
Gonzaga-analysis.122  Again the court looked to the statutes use of 
shall and must in both provisions and found that these terms were 
rights-creating terms with an individual focus.123  The court stated, 
it is evident . . . that the statutory language, despite countervailing 
structural elements of the statute, unambiguously confers rights which 
plaintiffs can enforce.124  The Third Circuit found that both the 
Reasonable Promptness and Quality of Care Provisions met the Gonzaga 
                                                     
 113. Id. at 709. 
 114. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999) (affirming the Eleventh 
Circuits decision in substantial part). 
 115. See Doe, 136 F.3d at 711.  For a summary and discussion of Doe ex rel. Doe v. Chiles in 
greater detail, see Wiggins, supra note 24, at 149697. 
 116. 324 F.3d 906 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 117. Id. at 908, 910, 913. 
 118. Id. at 910.  See also supra notes 2324 and accompanying text (discussing the definition of 
medical assistance). 
 119. 367 F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 120. Id. at 181. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 182, 19394. 
 123. Id. at 18990. 
 124. Id. at 192. 
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requirements for fulfillment of the Blessing test.125  Much like Doe ex rel. 
Doe v. Chiles, though, the Plaintiffs only sought relief with § 1983 and 
not under the ADA, and therefore no waiver programs were at issue. 
Also in 2004, the First Circuit heard Long Term Care Pharmacy 
Alliance v. Ferguson.126  The case involved pharmaceutical providers 
seeking enforcement of individual rights under the Equal Access 
Provision, claiming rates for pharmaceuticals would be insufficient under 
a proposed scheme.127  The Equal Access Provision requires state 
Medicaid plans to provide such methods and procedures relating to the 
utilization of, and the payment for, care and services available under the 
plan . . . to assure that payments are . . . sufficient to enlist enough 
providers so that care and services are available under the plan to the 
extent the services are available to the general population of that area.128  
Specifically reviewing the provision under Gonzaga, the court found no 
rights creating language and no discrete class of beneficiaries.129  
The court held that the statute was not particular enough to grant 
individual enforcement rights.130  Once again no waiver program was in 
issue or discussed throughout. 
After a review of the non-waiver § 1983 Medicaid cases, the Circuit 
Courts of Appeals appear to be somewhat in agreement: the Reasonable 
Promptness and Quality of Care Provisions are enforceable under § 
1983, the Equal Access Provision is not enforceable under § 1983, and 
nothing clear has been stated on the interaction between rights under 
Medicaid and rights under the ADA. 
2. Bryson v. Shumway, Watson v. Weeks, and Mandy R. ex rel. Mr. & 
Mrs. R. v. Owens: Section 1983 in a Waiver Program Context 
Each of the following cases involves a plaintiff seeking enforcement 
of a Medicaid state plan requirement in light of an existing waiver 
program through § 1983.  Pay particular attention to the interpretation of 
the Reasonable Promptness Provision in light of the existing waiver 
programs. 
In the 2002 case Bryson v. Shumway, the First Circuit found the 
Reasonable Promptness Provision of Medicaid enforceable using § 1983, 
                                                     
 125. Id. at 189. 
 126. 362 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 127. Id. at 56, 59. 
 128. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2000). 
 129. Long Term Care Pharm. Alliance, 362 F.3d at 57. 
 130. Id. at 5859. 
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but this time a waiver program was involved.131  In 1993, New 
Hampshire had sought and received an HCBS model waiver to provide 
home and community-based services to individuals with acquired brain 
disorders.132  The model waiver differs from regular waivers primarily 
in that model waivers . . . may not serve more than 200 individuals at any 
one time.133  From 1993 until the decision date in 2002, New Hampshire 
had consistently requested additional waiver slots, but was still under the 
200 person limit.134 
The Plaintiffs in Bryson were waiver-eligible individuals that had 
been placed on a waiting list.135  They claimed that the number of waiver 
slots should be as many slots as the number of applicants, up to a limit 
of 200, and that when a waiver slot became available, the slots were not 
filled within a reasonable time.136  The court reasoned against a 
requirement of at least 200 slots in the model waiver program,137 but 
more importantly, the court commented on how the Reasonable 
Promptness Provision applied to the waiver program.  Specifically, the 
court reasoned: Those patients who are on the waiting list and for whom 
slots are available are, we think, eligible under the statute such that they 
are entitled to reasonable promptness.138  This means that in order to 
receive reasonably prompt medical assistance under New Hampshires 
HCBS waiver, an individual must already be on a waiting list for waiver 
services and a waiver slot must be available.  This decision came after 
Olmstead, but the Court did not address discrimination claimed under the 
ADA.139 
In 2005, the Ninth Circuit handled a combination case in which 
Plaintiffs, a group of individuals with developmental disabilities, claimed 
violations of the Equal Access Provision of Medicaid, as well as 
discrimination under the ADA.140  More specifically, the Plaintiffs 
alleged that because California pays wages to community-based service 
providers participating in the HCBS waiver program at a lower rate than 
                                                     
 131. 308 F.3d 79, 81, 89 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 132. Id. at 8283. 
 133. Id. at 83 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 441.305(b)(1) (2002)). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 81, 83. 
 136. Id. at 81. 
 137. Id. at 86 (This statute, § 1396n(c)(10), is most plausibly read as limiting only the ability of 
the Secretary to impose such restrictions, and not the ability of the states to propose or the Secretary 
to approve waiver plans serving fewer than 200 individuals.). 
 138. Id. at 88 (internal citation omitted). 
 139. Id. at 8384. 
 140. Sanchez ex rel. Hoebel v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1053, 1055 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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it pays employees in state institutions, the State is in violation of the 
[Equal Access Provision] of the Medicaid Act . . . .141  The Plaintiffs 
also alleged that the lower pay in community-based programs . . . 
resulted in some developmentally disabled persons remaining 
unnecessarily institutionalized, which . . . constitutes discrimination 
against them in violation of the ADA . . . .142  The Plaintiffs were 
attempting to engage the court in analyzing a Medicaid waiver program 
in conjunction with the ADA through the Equal Access Provision. 
In examining the § 1983 claim, the court used recently-decided 
Gonzaga along with the reasoning in Long Term Care Pharmacy v. 
Ferguson to find that the Equal Access Provision did not include rights-
creating language.143  The court recognized pre-Gonzaga decisions which 
did find a § 1983-enforceable right in this provision, but held that there 
is nothing in the text of § 30(A) that unmistakably focuses on recipients 
or providers as individuals.  Moreover, the flexible administrative 
standards embodied in the statute do not reflect a Congressional intent to 
provide a private remedy for their violation.144  Given the overall 
agreement by the circuits that the Equal Access Provision is not § 1983-
enforceable regardless of the waiver, this result is not surprising.145 
As for the discrimination claims, the court found that the existence of 
an acceptable Olmstead Plan precluded mandating increased home and 
community-based services, a fundamental alteration of a 
comprehensive, working plan for deinstitutionalization.146  This same 
line of reasoning was used by the Ninth Circuit in dismissing 
institutionalization-discrimination claims in Washington.147 
In 2006, the Ninth Circuit handled Watson v. Weeks, another waiver 
case brought using § 1983.148  Oregon had scaled back its home and 
community-based services under Medicaid in response to budgetary 
concerns.149  When a group of individuals lost their HCBS services as 
part of these cutbacks, theyalong with their legal representatives
worked with the Oregon Advocacy Center to fight back.150  Though their 
                                                     
 141. Id. at 1055. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 105860. 
 144. Id. at 1059. 
 145. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 146. Sanchez, 416 F.3d at 1068. 
 147. See supra notes 7985 and accompanying text (discussing Arc of Wash. State, Inc. v. 
Braddock, 427 F.3d 615, 619 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
 148. 436 F.3d 1152, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 598 (2006). 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 1152, 1154. 
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original claims were dismissed by the District Court, the Ninth Circuit 
found that the Plaintiffs could use § 1983 to enforce their rights under the 
Medicaid Quality of Care Provisions,151 but found that another provision 
requiring states to use reasonable standards in eligibility 
determinations152 did not provide an unambiguously conferred right 
and was too vague and amorphous for judicial enforcement, thus 
failing the Blessing test.153 
Also in 2006, the Tenth Circuit addressed accessing Medicaid waiver 
programs under § 1983 in Mandy R. ex rel. Mr. & Mrs. R. v. Owens.154  
Plaintiffs, people with developmental disabilities on Colorados HCBS 
waiver program waiting list, sought to enforce access to the HCBS 
services through the Reasonable Promptness Provision, the Quality of 
Care Provision, and the Equal Access Provision.155 
The court, for purposes of this case, assumed enforceability of the 
Reasonable Promptness and Quality of Care Provisions under § 1983, 
but rejected claims under both because medical assistance is defined as 
payment for, but not provision of, services.156  Using this definition in 
connection with these two provisions, the court found: 
[T]he Medicaid Act requires any state participating in Medicaid to pay 
promptly and evenhandedly for medical services when the state is 
presented with the bill.  If that is all the statute requires, then the 
plaintiffs have no claim: they are on a waiting list for services, not a 
waiting list for payment for services.157 
The Tenth Circuit went on to hold that no enforceable right existed 
under the Equal Access Provision of Medicaid.158 
The § 1983 Medicaid waiver cases do not differ dramatically from 
the non-waiver cases.  Yet, the interpretation of the Reasonable 
Promptness Provision in this line of cases creates a particular barrier.  An 
individual eligible for waiver program services has the right to 
reasonably prompt payment of those services and, possibly, reasonably 
prompt access to a slot once a slot becomes available.  Regardless of 
                                                     
 151. Id. at 1161 (discussing § 1396a(a)(10) generally as opposed to § 1396a(a)(10)(B) 
specifically). 
 152. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (2000). 
 153. Watson, 436 F.3d at 1162. 
 154. 464 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1905 (2007). 
 155. Id. at 1141.  The Tenth Circuit refers to the Quality of Care Provision as the Comparability 
Provision, and to the Equal Access Provision as the Sufficient Payment Provision. 
 156. Id. at 1143. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 1148. 
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whether medical assistance includes anything other than payment for 
services, there is no right to reasonably prompt waiver program services 
unless a slot is available.  An individual cannot seek redress for lack of 
waiver program availability. 
3. The EPSDT Twist 
There are several important cases in the § 1983 Medicaid line that 
have not yet been discussed.  The following cases involve Medicaid 
beneficiaries trying to enforce a right of access to Early Periodic 
Screening and Diagnostic Testing (EPSDT) using § 1983.159  Westside 
Mothers v. Olszewski,160 Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Arkansas 
Department of Human Services,161 S.D. ex rel. Dickson v. Hood,162 and 
Oklahoma Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics (OKAAP) v. 
Fogarty163 represent courts grappling with the provision of EPSDT 
services to children and youth twenty-one and under.  Westside Mothers 
also illustrates the ongoing nature of Medicaid litigation, the original 
action having been filed in 1999.164 
While children can often be served by waiver programs,165 the 
EPSDT language guarantees a broad array of services without requiring 
waiver access and has been held to contain a right to those services 
enforceable by § 1983.166  EPSDT differs significantly from the 
Medicaid provisions discussed above.  Particularly, EPSDT changes the 
definition of medical assistance to include other diagnostic, screening, 
preventive, and rehabilitative services, including any medical or remedial 
                                                     
 159. A right of access to EPSDT is conferred by 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(13) (2000). 
 160. 454 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 161. 443 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2006), vacated in part on other grounds, 127 S. Ct. 3000 (2007). 
 162. 391 F.3d 581 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 163. 472 F.3d 1208 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 68 (2007). 
 164. 454 F.3d at 536.  In fact, earlier decisions in the Westside Mothers litigation caused quite a 
stir among scholars.  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Ensuring the Supremacy of Federal Law: Why 
the District Court Was Wrong in Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 139, 13940 
(2002) (stating that the Westside Mothers decision is fundamentally wrong and dangerous to 
ensuring the supremacy of federal law); Michael A. Platt, Comment, Westside Mothers and 
Medicaid: Will This Mean the End of Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Using 
Section 1983?, 51 AM. U. L. REV. 273, 273 (2001) (stating that the Westside Mothers proposition 
has sent shock waves throughout the public interest community). 
 165. Kansas provides waiver services to children with disabilities through the Mental 
Retardation/Developmental Disability Waiver, the Physical Disability Waiver, the Technology 
Assistance Waiver, and the Severe Emotional Disturbance Waiver.  Kansas Social and 
Rehabilitation Services, http://www.srskansas.org/services.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2007) (follow 
cascading menu for children services). 
 166. Dickson, 391 F.3d at 604; Westside Mothers, 454 F.3d at 538; Pediatric Specialty, 443 F.3d 
at 1008. 
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services (provided in a facility, a home, or other setting) recommended 
by a physician . . . for the maximum reduction of physical or mental 
disability and restoration of an individual to the best possible functional 
level for children twenty-one and under.167  None of these cases address 
EPSDT in the context of a waiver program and the cases conflict over 
enforceability of the Equal Access Provisions and over the definition of 
medical assistance. 
Westside Mothers and Pediatric Specialty, though both finding 
EPSDT an enforceable right, agree on little else.  Westside Mothers 
clearly limits medical assistance to financial assistance and denies § 1983 
enforceability of the Equal Access Provision.168  Pediatric Specialty, on 
the other hand, broadly interprets the Equal Access Provision to be 
individually enforceable under § 1983, and rather than limit medical 
assistance, the Court found the Plaintiffs to have clearly established 
rights to provide and receive medically necessary health care.169  
OKAAP does not explicitly find EPSDT as an enforceable right but 
rather continues the Tenth Circuits conclusions in Mandy R. that 
medical assistance is only financial payment for medical services and 
EPSDT is just a form of medical assistance.170 
In district courts around the country, EPSDT continues to be 
enforced even for innovative services like wraparound servicesthe 
practice of serving a child in each aspect of his or her life without 
compartmentalizing need, thus wrapping the services around the 
child.  In Katie A. v. Bonta, the District Court for the Central District of 
California acknowledged a § 1983 right to enforcement of EPSDT 
services,171 and concluded that the EPSDT statute provided for medically 
necessary wraparound services and therapeutic foster care.172  In the 
District of Massachusetts, children with severe emotional disturbance 
were able to access EPSDT services via § 1983 for comprehensive 
assessment services.173  While the interaction between waiver programs 
and EPSDT has not been clearly addressed by the courts, an enforceable 
right to EPSDT has not met the same resistance, and cannot be waived in 
the same way, as the other state plan requirements.  Furthermore, EPSDT 
language is more mandatory than precatory, and has withstood 
                                                     
 167. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a)(13) (2000). 
 168. 454 F.3d at 540, 543. 
 169. 443 F.3d at 1017. 
 170. OKAAP, 472 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 171. 433 F. Supp. 2d 1065, 1071 (C.D. Cal. 2006), revd and remanded on other grounds, 481 
F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 172. Id. at 1073. 
 173. Rosie D. v. Romney, 410 F. Supp. 2d 18, 52 (D. Mass. 2006). 
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challenges under Gonzaga.  Even if EPSDT is only the financial 
provision of that set of medical services, all eligible individuals should 
be able to access these services regardless of the existence of a waiver 
program, alleviating concerns about EPSDT under Medicaids more 
managed-care-like atmosphere.174 
4. Using § 1983 to Enforce Medicaid Provisions in a Waiver System 
The most important difference inherent in § 1983 litigation involving 
Medicaid waiver cases lies in the interpretation of the Reasonable 
Promptness Provision.  Even setting aside the extreme nature of Mandy 
R.,175 the Reasonable Promptness Provision has primarily been 
interpreted to mean that no more than a reasonable time should pass 
between the opening of a waiver slot to the filling of that slot by a 
qualified beneficiary.  This interpretationcombined with the fact that 
no appellate court has found discrimination in a limited waiver 
programshows that while an individual receiving typical fee-for-
service Medicaid services has a right to reasonably prompt medical 
assistance, an individual qualified to receive waiver services only has a 
right to reasonably prompt medical assistance once a slot on the waiver 
becomes available.  There is no requirement to make waiver services 
available for an individual if, systemically, the state in question has an 
Olmstead-plan. 
Each of the waiver programs discussed in a § 1983 context were 
HCBS waivers, which still require compliance with a majority of the 
state plan requirements.176  Perhaps no § 1983 Demonstration Project 
waiver cases have been published because waiving all state plan 
requirements waives any § 1983-enforceable right. 
One possible bright spot in this analysis lies with the EPSDT 
guarantee for children.  Unlike other provisions of Medicaid, EPSDT 
cannot be waived by HCBS waivers.177  Unfortunately, EPSDT might be 
able to be waived by Demonstration Project waiver programs or the new 
DRA waiver programs.178  However, with HCBS waivers still composing  
 
                                                     
 174. See generally John A. Flippen, Note, The Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and 
Treatment Program and Managed Medicaid Mental Health Care: The Need to Reevalute the EPSDT 
in the Managed Care Era, 50 VAND. L. REV. 683 (1997). 
 175. Mandy R. ex rel. Mr. & Mrs. R. v. Owens, 464 F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th Cir. 2006) ([T]hey 
are on a waiting list for services, not a waiting list for payment for services.). 
 176. See supra notes 3037 and accompanying text (describing HCBS waivers). 
 177. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (2000). 
 178. See infra Part IV.B.1 (describing DRA waivers). 
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the majority of waiver programs, seeking enforcement of EPSDT access 
under § 1983 should not only be feasible but successful. 
When comparing possible HCBS waiver services (case 
management services, homemaker/home health aid services and personal 
care services . . . habilitation services, respite care179) with EPSDT 
benefits (any medical or remedial services . . . recommended by a 
physician or other licensed practitioner of the healing arts within the 
scope of their practice under State law, for the maximum reduction of 
physical or mental disability and restoration of an individual to the best 
possible function level180), there is hope that, at least eligible children 
with disabilities can be free from the discrimination prohibited by the 
ADA in the administration of Medicaid. 
IV. NEW CONCERNS REQUIRE NEW STRATEGIES TO PRESERVE THE 
RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 
Reconsider Janes dilemma in light of § 1983 Medicaid cases.  As 
discussed under the Olmstead-waiver program construction, Jane cannot 
use the ADA to enforce her right to services in a more integrated setting 
so long as the state she lives in has made a commitment to de-
institutionalization, as evidenced by an Olmstead-type plan.181  If Janes 
state has a waiver program to address her particularized need, she can 
only use § 1983 to enforce reasonably prompt access to services once a 
slot in that waiver program becomes available. 
Considering the wide array of new and existing waiver programs, it 
is extremely unlikely that Jane lives in a state without a waiver program 
for which she is eligible.182  But perhaps in that unlikely situation, Jane 
would be able to prove discrimination under the ADA.  Even so, would 
Jane be able to transfer her institutional Medicaid to a community 
placement without an existing waiver program?  Olmstead did not 
answer this questionGeorgia did have a waiver program in place for 
which the Plaintiffs were eligible.183  The Court did state, though, that 
states must provide community placement when community placement is 
not only appropriate and unopposed by the affected person, but can be 
reasonably accommodated, taking into account the resources available to 
                                                     
 179. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(4)(B). 
 180. Id. § 1396d(a)(13). 
 181. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 182. See CMS Waiver Program List, supra note 36 (identifying at least one waiver program 
operating in each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia). 
 183. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 60203 (1999). 
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the State and the needs of others with mental disabilities.184  The reason 
waiver programs were created in the first place was to account for 
Medicaids inability to efficiently serve individuals requiring an array of 
services. 
It seems that not much has been accomplished in securing an 
enforceable right to reasonably prompt Medicaid servicesa service of 
public accommodationin the most integrated setting as required by the 
ADA.  Commentators argue whether any Medicaid provision should be 
enforceable with § 1983.185  The definition of medical assistance limits 
what a Medicaid entitlement actually is: payment for services, not 
provision of services.186  Medicaid reform is pushing toward more 
waivers and managed care.187  This outlook, combined with the bleak 
analysis of existing individual rights to de-institutionalization presented 
above, necessitates innovation. 
A. The Lankford Answer 
1. Lankford v. Sherman 
In response to Missouris state budget crisis, its legislature revised a 
statute which provided durable medical equipment (DME) as a stand-
alone benefit to all Medicaid recipients.188  Under the new statute, only 
Medicaid recipients who are blind, pregnant, or needy children, or . . . 
those who receive home health care services under the state plan could 
receive durable medical equipment as a Medicaid service.189  Plaintiffs, 
Medicaid beneficiaries who had received DME previously,190 asserted 
violations of federal comparability and reasonable-standards 
requirements that the State treat Medicaid recipients equally and with 
reasonable, non-discriminatory standards191 and claimed the new state 
                                                     
 184. Id. at 607. 
 185. See Mark Andrew Ison, Note, Two Wrongs Dont Make a Right: Medicaid, Section 1983 
and the Cost of an Enforceable Right to Health Care, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1479, 148182 (2003) 
(arguing against enforceability of Medicaid using § 1983); Joshua Tenzer, Note, Reaching the Final 
Frontiers in Medicaid Managed Care, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 329, 331 (2006) (Medicaid 
should apply the managed care model consistently across Medicaid.). 
 186. Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Tenuous Nature of the Medicaid Entitlement: Federal Rights 
Remain Under Threat and Must Be Strengthened, 22 HEALTH AFF. No. 1, 145, 145 (2003). 
 187. John V. Jacobi, Dangerous Times for Medicaid, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 834, 83637 
(2005); Perkins & Boyle, supra note 37, at 119. 
 188. Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 501 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Specifically, the Plaintiffs asserted that both 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B), the Quality of 
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regulation conflict[ed] with these federal requirements, and [was] 
preempted by the Supremacy Clause.192  While this case does not 
discuss any of the Medicaid waiver programs, it does address the Quality 
of Service and the Reasonable Standards Provisions of Medicaid: the 
Quality of Service Provision was not violated193 and § 1983 cannot be 
used to enforce the Reasonable Standards Provision.194 
However, the case did not end there.  The Eighth Circuit evaluated 
the new DME regulation under the preemption doctrine because, 
according to Plaintiffs, the regulation directly conflict[ed] with 
Medicaids reasonable-standards requirements.195  Under the 
preemption doctrine, state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to 
the laws of [C]ongress, made in pursuance of the constitution are 
preempted.196  Because the Medicaid Act does not expressly preempt[] 
or entirely displace[] state regulation in a specific field . . . state law is 
preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law.197  
Because Missouri receives federal Medicaid dollars, it is required to 
comply with Medicaids reasonable-standards requirement, and its 
implementing regulations.198  The restricted nature of Missouris DME 
regulation, according to the court, appear[ed] unreasonable under 
directives from both CMS and this court.199  Accordingly, the court 
found a likelihood of success on the merits of the preemption claim 
allowing Plaintiffs to proceed in their case for a preliminary injunction 
against the state.200 
2. Supremacy Clause Claim Feasibility 
Although the Lankford v. Sherman development has sparked 
excitement among disability rights activists as a new possible avenue for 
relief, the case does not actually hold that a federal Medicaid statute 
preempts the states relevant Medicaid regulation.201  Although success 
                                                                                                                       
Care Provision, and 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17), the Reasonable Standards Provision, were violated.  
Id. at 502. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See id. at 506 (finding no violation because of the DME programs funding structure). 
 194. Id. at 509 (citing Watson v. Weeks, 436 F.3d 1152, 1162 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 50910 (quoting Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604 (1991)). 
 197. Id. at 510 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. 
Commn, 461 U.S. 190, 204 (1983)). 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 513. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See id. (vacating district courts order denying preliminary injunction and remanding for 
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on the merits was considered likely, it had not yet occurred.  
Unfortunately, other plaintiffs have seen little success when attempting 
to enforce Medicaid rights asserting violations of the Supremacy Clause. 
Particularly, in Equal Access for El Paso, Inc. v. Hawkins,202 the 
court found the Plaintiffs Supremacy Clause claim functionally 
equivalent to Plaintiffs claim under § 1983, and held that Plaintiffs do 
not state a cognizable claim under the Supremacy Clause that is distinct 
from their § 1983 claim pursuant to the Equal Access Provision.203  The 
Plaintiffs did have standing to allege that [the state Medicaid programs] 
implementation of Medicaid violate[d] the Supremacy Clause in that it 
[was] inconsistent with certain provisions of the Medicaid Act.204  But 
the Plaintiffs two-fold Supremacy Clause claim failed to identify a 
portion of the state statute which conflicted with federal law.205 
As § 1983-enforceable rights to Medicaid erode under the increased 
use of waiver programs, and the ADAs de-institutionalization mandate 
is seen as systemic rather than as an individual right, could the 
Supremacy Clause breathe new life into the disability rights movement in 
the legal community?  At this time, it is unclear what leeway courts will 
give plaintiffs in this new realm of pleading.  However, neither Lankford 
nor Equal Access addressed a waiver program problem.  Given the 
substantial control states have over Medicaid programs in general, and 
the waiver programs specifically, it seems unlikely that a court will find 
state statutes conflicting with federal Medicaid law amid the enactment 
of waiver programsprograms designed to operate outside of federal 
regulation.206 
B. Further Devolution 
In 1997, the Balanced Budget Act appreciably lessened federal 
control over state managed-care programs.207  As states increase their 
governing capacitythe ability to formulate coherent, creative, 
plausible policy and carry it out efficiently, effectively, and 
                                                                                                                       
further proceedings). 
 202. 428 F. Supp. 2d 585 (W.D. Tex. 2006), revd and remanded on other grounds, No. 06-
50599, 2007 WL 4295380 (5th Cir. Dec. 10, 2007). 
 203. Id. at 624 (citation omitted). 
 204. Id. at 608. 
 205. Id. at 60708. 
 206. For an overview of the ADAs constitutionality, or potential unconstitutionality, see James 
Leonard, The Shadows of Unconstitutionality: How the New Federalism May Affect the Anti-
Discrimination Mandate of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 91 (2000). 
 207. James W. Fossett, Managed Care and Devolution, in MEDICAID AND DEVOLUTION, 106, 
106 (Frank J. Thompson & John J. DiIulio, Jr. eds., 1998). 
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accountablymore administrative control rests with the states, as 
opposed to the federal government, in Medicaids administration.208  This 
is clearly evidenced by further ceding of Medicaid control to the states 
through the DRA. 
However, federal control, especially over eligibility and benefits, 
can protect Medicaid beneficiaries from states reacting to bad 
economic times by cutting Medicaid programs.209  With over one-third 
of all Medicaid dollars being spent on long-term care for people with 
disabilities and the elderly,210 disability rights advocates should carefully 
follow how Medicaid programs are being restructured at both the state 
and federal level. 
1. The Deficit Reduction Act 
As previously mentioned, the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 made 
additional changes to Medicaid.  Significantly, [t]he DRA also creates 
two new waiver authorities and allows states to implement some 
policies that would have required a waiver from the Secretary before the 
passage of the DRA.211  The DRA is intended to produce close to five 
billion dollars in net savings to the federal government over the next 
five years through its wide array of changes to federal Medicaid.212 
Some of the policy changes states can now make through state plan 
amendments include basically eliminating the Quality of Care Provision 
requirement.213  This means that now, under traditional Medicaid, states 
can opt out of providing services which shall not be less in amount, 
duration, or scope than the medical assistance made available to any 
other such individual.214  While the waiver programs (which were not 
eliminated by the DRA) operate under the discretion of the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services, the state plan amendment procedure is less 
formal and allows the Secretary less discretion in deciding whether to 
accept the policy change.215  Changing policy through state plan 
amendments will also result in additional federal spending because 
                                                     
 208. Frank J. Thompson, Federalism and the Medicaid Challenge, in MEDICAID AND 
DEVOLUTION, supra note 207, at 258, 260. 
 209. Jacobi, supra note 187, at 840. 
 210. 2006 KFF Medicaid State Survey, supra note 7, at 11. 
 211. RUDOWITZ & SCHNEIDER, supra note 29, at 2. 
 212. Id. at 11. 
 213. See id. at 12 (discussing flexibility given to states to provide different benchmark benefit 
packages to individuals). 
 214. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(B)(i) (2000). 
 215. RUDOWITZ & SCHNEIDER, supra note 29, at 910. 
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unlike the budget-neutral waiver programs, if a state plan amendment is 
consistent with the federal Medicaid requirements, the Secretary is 
obligated to approve it.216 
These policy changes have not been viewed under a judicial lens 
yet,217 but the changes appear to offer even greater flexibility to the states 
in implementing Medicaid while remaining eligible for federal dollars.  
Furthermore, the ability of states to sidestep the Quality of Care 
Provision potentially eliminates the enforceability of that provision under 
§ 1983 by any Medicaid beneficiarynot just waiver program 
participants. 
2. Money Follows the Person 
On November 1, 2006, the states submitted to the federal 
government applications to receive part of 1.75 billion dollars in grant 
money to assist moving individuals in institutions to more integrated 
environments.218  This grant money will be disbursed to state Medicaid 
programs in the form of Money Follows the Person Real Choice Systems 
Change grants.219  These grants are designed to help states increase home 
and community-based services by eliminating the barriers between types 
of fundingtypical fee-for-service Medicaid and Medicaid waiver 
programs.220  Ultimately, more Medicaid dollars will go toward home 
and community-based services.  This certainly is an idealistic goal
institutionalization is discriminatory, and providing additional HCBS 
services satisfies more people with disabilities and their desire to live in 
an integrated setting.221 
But the following question remains unanswered: What happened to 
the right to services in the most integrated setting?  This right is clearly 
protected by the ADA.  An attempt to enforce this right was made in 
                                                     
 216. Id. at 10. 
 217. Challenges to the constitutionality of the DRA are under way due to a discovery after its 
passage that a typographical error had caused each house of Congress to pass a different version of 
the bill.  Kelly S. Davis et al., Medicaid: From the Frying Pan into the Fire, WYO. LAW., Dec. 
2006, at 2526. 
 218. Knox, supra note 2. 
 219. CTRS. FOR MEDICAID AND MEDICARE, REAL CHOICE OVERVIEW, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/ 
RealChoice/01_Overview.asp (last visited Oct. 8, 2007). 
 220. WAYNE L. ANDERSON ET AL., MONEY FOLLOWS THE PERSON INITIATIVES OF SYSTEMS 
CHANGE GRANTEES: FINAL REPORT 21 (2006), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/RealChoice/ 
downloads/MFP.pdf. 
 221. See Batavia, supra note 25, at 1819 (noting consumer-directed personal assistance services 
provide the significant benefits [of] consumer autonomy, satisfaction, and improved health and 
function). 
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Olmstead.  Yet neither the ADA nor § 1983 have been able to make this 
right enforceable under Medicaidthe primary funding source for home 
and community-based services. 
Will individuals be able to remain in the community if and when the 
Medicaid funds are eliminated or eligibility-determinations are greatly 
altered?  These are both real possibilities when operating state Medicaid 
programs outside federal regulations.  Without the cost-containment 
structure of previous waiver programs, will Money Follows the Person 
grants lead to the ultimate bankrupting of the Medicaid system?  While 
this type of panicked thinking appears contrary to the aims under which 
Money Follows the Person was passed, the absence of regulatory 
oversight, combined with the present entitlement problem for home and 
community-based services, presents valid fears for individuals relying on 
these very grants to finally experience freedom. 
C. Eliminating Traditional Medicaid? 
Professor Timothy Stoltzfus Jost has argued for a complete overhaul 
of the American health care system.222  The new system would wholly 
replace Medicaid, and Professor Jost asserts that few would mourn its 
passing.223  Considering Medicaids expense, complexity, and lessening 
entitlement, Professor Jost might be right.  However, while sweeping 
political changes are difficult to make, making them in a way that keeps 
a safety net under the very people Medicaid is attempting to serve would 
be next to impossible.   
Professor Jost refers to Medicaid as fifty different programs 
[dealing] with what is essentially a national problem.224  However, when 
taking all of the waiver programs into account, alongside the traditional 
fee-for-service structure, there are closer to five hundred partially 
federally-funded programs serving one-sixth of the American populous.  
Considering further that most home and community-based services are 
provided to only fourteen percent of Medicaid enrollees, over four 
hundred programs serve two percent of Americans.225 
                                                     
 222. See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, Our Broken Health Care System and How to Fix It: An Essay 
on Health Law and Policy, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 537, 540 (2006) (describing the system as a 
hodgepodge of laws). 
 223. Id. at 610. 
 224. Id. at 608. 
 225. Compare id. (noting the futility of creating multiple programs to handle a national problem) 
with 2006 KFF Medicaid State Survey, supra note 7, at 11 (discussing the distribution of Medicaid 
enrollees and expenditures). 
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Professor Jost begins his argument by outlining federal health care 
programs: Medicare, Medicaid, and tax subsidies for employment-based 
insurance.226  He also outlines the three major problems health care 
reform should address comprehensively: access, cost, and quality.227  
Rather than unabashedly touting universal health care, a concept 
politically unappetizing to most Americans,228 Professor Jost instead 
offers a five-tier private-public partnership placing the highest risk health 
care with the federal government, the lowest risk health care with 
individuals, and still offering a safety net to those with the lowest 
incomes.229 
Professor Jost places long-term care alongside prohibitively 
expensive medical procedures and suggests it should be financed by the 
government.230  He would also offer a basic set of preventive 
services . . . to all regardless of ability to pay.231  [L]ow-cost, 
predictable items and services would remain private responsibilities for 
all but the poorest individuals, and life-style care would primarily be 
privately financed.232  All other medical expenses would be covered by 
insurance which [e]veryone would be required by law to carry.233 
This type of program is attractive because of the guarantee it would 
give individuals with disabilities to non-discriminatory health care 
services.  It would also decrease the complexity of the service-provision 
system for individuals in need of long-term care.  However, any attempt 
to overhaul Medicaid needs to include mandatory, rather than precatory, 
language about the rights of individuals eligible for the program.  
Finally, Professor Josts proposal requires reviews of the tax code and 
Medicaretopics arguably as unappealing to Congress as Medicaid
and as such are likely to meet with the continued incremental approach 
each topic has faced, not a sweeping overhaul. 
D. Creative Thinking with an Eye Toward Individual Rights 
In the current political environment, many and varied ideas exist as 
to how to control the cost of health care.  Rather than continuing 
                                                     
 226. Jost, supra note 222, at 55761. 
 227. Id. at 573. 
 228. See id. at 598 (noting that Americans are particularly unlikely to accept government 
provision of health care). 
 229. Id. at 598601. 
 230. Id. at 599. 
 231. Id. at 601. 
 232. Id. at 599600. 
 233. Id. at 601. 
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Medicaids devolution, completely overhauling Medicaid offers more 
protection for individual rights.  Perhaps Americans are not ready to 
view health care as a universal, human right.  However, when health care 
is so intertwined with daily lifesuch as whether a person resides in a 
nursing home or has a right to receive health care in their own home
individual rights cannot be ignored. 
If legislation today could enjoy the ease of passage the ADA 
received in 1990, Congress might be able to solve the present dilemma.  
Congress could amend the Medicaid Act to require reasonably prompt 
access to waiver services, not just the payment of those services once a 
waiver slot is available.  Congress could clarify the ADAs prohibition 
against discrimination by public entities to discuss this provisions 
impact on public health care programs, like Medicaid.   
V. CONCLUSION 
For most people, civil rightsthe right to vote, the right to due 
process, the right to freedom from religious, gender-based, racial, and 
age-based discriminationare considered individual rights.  However, 
after recognizing institutionalization as a form of discrimination faced 
primarily by people with disabilities, the courts and Congress have 
allowed institutionalizations continued existence.  Until Congress 
introduces entitlement language into the waiver programs, or until the 
courts enforce the ADA more strictly and without caveats, a freedom 
from institutionalization cannot be guaranteed for people with disabilities 
while receiving adequate health care. 
Traditional § 1983 litigation no longer offers the same enforcement 
of access to the Medicaid entitlement due, in part, to the cost-saving 
mechanisms of the Medicaid Act.  The ADA, though prohibiting 
discrimination in the administration of public programs, has not been 
able to offer freedom from discrimination (in the form of 
institutionalization) due to the systemic-basis language of Olmstead.  
When analyzed together, courts attempting to navigate . . . the murky 
waters between two statutory bodies: Medicaid and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act234 have received no assistance from the Supreme Court. 
Granting certiorari to a § 1983 Medicaid case could potentially assist 
lower courts, but it could also amplify the Olmstead problem.  Olmstead 
was decided outside of the Medicaid framework and solely on ADA 
grounds.  If a similar case is decided solely on Medicaid grounds and 
                                                     
 234. Arc of Wash. State Inc. v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 615, 617 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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outside an ADA framework, it seems plausible that the two decisions 
could conflict in application, much like the conflicting applications of the 
individual statutes. 
While attempting to resolve this problem in the existing legal 
landscape is not an easy task, advocates cannot focus their attention in 
only one arena.  Additional attention must be paid to the devolution of 
Medicaid and to the additional consequences from the passage of the 
Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 and the implementation of Money 
Follows the Person.  Will we continue to see an erosion of civil rights for 
people with disabilities?  Can we really start all over with public health 
care? 
Remember Janes dilemma: she could, with reasonable support, live 
on her own outside of an institution.  It is more cost-effective for her 
state, as well as more desirable for Jane.  Yet Jane is only guaranteed 
institutional care at this time despite the widespread movement toward 
community-based services.  Janes individual right has been limited by 
the interpretation of the ADAs anti-discrimination mandates, and further 
constrained by Medicaids devolution to the states. 
Laws do not operate in a vacuum.  People with disabilities should be 
able to realize and enforce their civil rights, which were finally 
recognized with the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act.  
More importantly, people with disabilities should no longer have to face 
the threat of institutionalization as the only guaranteed means to receive 
adequate health care from a public program.  The serious and pervasive 
social problem of discriminating against people with disabilities through 
segregation and isolation235 must end. 
 
                                                     
 235. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000). 
